




M&A  ATTRACTIVENESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
Mergers and acquisitions form the majority of FDI deals in the developed world, but remain 
relatively scarce as a mode of entry in the developing world. The infrequent use of M&A as a 
foreign direct investment (FDI) entry modality into developing regions has motivated this study. 
As a first step in exploring the M&A paradigm in developing markets this paper will classify and 
rank the M&A attractiveness of 117 developing economies. Further, the distinction between FDI 
attractiveness and M&A attractiveness at a country and regional level will be illustrated.  
Mergers and acquisitions, as a mode of FDI are rare in d veloping countries. Only 26, 9 percent of 
the 11059 FDI developing economy deals documented i this study and concluded between 2004 
and 2006 were cross border merger and acquisition deals, the remaining 73% of deals were all 
greenfield. Within the period 2002 to 2004, mergers and acquisitions made up a mere 19% of the 
total number foreign direct investment (FDI) deals concluded in developing economies. In 
contrast, cross- country mergers and acquisitions held far greater appeal in the developed world 
where M&A’s outnumbered greenfield FDI deals by making up 51% of the total FDI deals 
concluded over the same period 2002 to 2004 (UNCTAD, 2007). The clear preference for 
greenfield deals in the developing world indicates hat there exist elements within locations 
attractive to M&A’s which are distinctive from those locations attracting greater greenfield 
activity. In order to understand these elements, M&A attractive and unattractive locations must 
first be identified and classified.  
M&A and greenfield are two distinct modes of entry with differing motivations and dissimilar host 
country effects. M&A involves the purchase of a contr lling share of stock in an existing host 





greenfield investments see the foreign firm building its own independent business, and sourcing all 
resources directly from the market (Nocke and Yeapl, 2007).  
The FDI attractiveness of economies has been well exp ored in the literature. However, research 
on the role of FDI in economic development is dominated by a generalised view of FDI where the 
separation of entry mode strategies was not central. Several authors have commented on the 
underreporting of M&A as a process distinct from the FDI umbrella in the literature; these same 
authors have begun to explore in greater depth the M&A concept (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Raff et 
al, Ryan & Stähler, 2005; Nocke & Yeaple, 2007 & Haller, 2008).   
The M&A literature is concentrated on the developed economies of the world as the greatest 
volume of M&A activity has historically occurred indeveloped regions. Much of the literature on 
M&A’s describes the increasing number of these deals and its importance in global FDI, often by 
referring to the global total (Haller, 2008; Bjorvatn, 2004; Horn & Persson, 2001, Shimizu, Hitt, 
Vaidyanath, Pisano, 2004). None of these studies have referred to the relative scarcity in utilisation 
of M&A‘s in the developing world relative to the developed regions of the globe. This paper aims 
to make a contribution not just to the emerging litera ure on M&A’s but also to its particular 
developing economy paradigm. 
The methodology of this study allows for the identification and ranking of FDI attractive 
economies, M&A attractive economies and for the distinction to be drawn between M&A 
attractive economies at the country level and M&A attractiveness at a regional level.  At the 
country level M&A attractive economies are economies which attracted more M&A than 
greenfield deals internally i.e. economies attracting a greater ratio of M&A activity to greenfield 
investments.  Regional M&A attractive economies were defined as economies which whilst 





M&A deals internally. Greenfield deals continue to d minate these markets. In other words these 
countries were M&A attractive by virtue of being FDI attractive.  
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES  
 
Understanding the distinction between developed and developing economies and foreign direct 
investment in these markets is fundamental to this study.  
Per capita income, an indicator of the wealth and potential of a market, is an important 
manifestation of the differences between developing a d developed economies. Unfortunately 
however, developing economies are subject to frequent policy regime switches and growth rate 
volatility when compared against the group of develop d economies (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007).  
Productivity in emerging markets is unstable, here the cycle of political and economic shocks have 
become trends (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). The income inequality, higher poverty levels, 
governance, institutional contexts (North, 1994; Peng and Heath, 1996)  and the level of economic 
and human development of developing economies is offset by the fact that since the early 1990’s 
these countries have also been the fastest growing market in the world for products and services 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2005). The strategic choices made by multinationals engaging in developing 
markets must necessarily be considered with respect to the above mentioned host country factors. 
Many developing economies which are characterised by an accelerated pace of economic 
development and a liberalisation or opening of their economies by the application of free market 
principles are termed emerging economies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, Wright, 2000). Other rapid 
growth countries included in this group are the transition economies of Eastern Europe which were 
historically planned economies but have now adopted fr e market principles (Hoskisson et al, 






The literature is dominated by developed economy FDI. However, FDI patterns observed in 
developed countries cannot be generalized to transiio al or developing economies (Pan, 2003). 
Blonigen and Wang (2005) have established that the factors determining the location of FDI “vary 
systematically” between developing and developed countries (Blonigen and Wang, 2005). In their 
paper, Phylatakis and Xia (2006) investigate the dynamics of global, country and industry effects 
in firm level returns between developed and emerging, markets.  Their findings show that 
especially for emerging markets, country effects are more important than industry effects in 
explaining return variation for firms (Phylatakis and Xia, 2006). Sethi, Guisinger, Phelan and Berg 
(2003) believe that FDI flow should not only be studied at a firm level but additionally at a country 
level as country level factors affect the decisions f all firms over time (Sethi et al, 2003). In 
addition, not all of the hypothesized relationships in the literature on FDI (e.g. exchange rates and 
source country size) were supported in a study on the transitional economy of China (Pan, 2003). 
This suggests that the developed and developing region FDI paradigms should be studied as 
distinct entities. 
L OCATION FACTORS  
Encouraged by superior technology, faster and cheaper communications and motivated by 
intensifying competition, businesses are able to scour the globe in search of locations offering 
advantages which increase the competitiveness of the firm. Location advantages refer to the 
institutional and productive factors which are present in the particular geographic area chosen for 
FDI (Galan and Gonzalez-Benito, 2006).  Dunning’s OLI theory explains a firm’s choice for a 





exploit abroad and which is portable. This is termed the ownership advantage (the O advantage) of 
the firm. The ‘L’, which is the focus of our research, refers to the location which must have 
desirable qualities and offer advantages to the firm. Examples of this would include large markets, 
production factors including cheap or skilled labour r natural resources. A locational advantage 
would enhance the profits of a firm.  The ‘I’ refers to internalisation, which implies the firm has 
more to gain from the total control of the asset than by allowing control to rest with export agents 
or licensees (Dunning, 2001).  
Tong, Alessandri, Reur and Chintakananda (2008) find that country and industry effects and their 
interaction substantially influence firm performance. The authors advocate that industries with 
growth opportunities learn how to exploit country specific factors by locating operations there.  
Even though low labour costs are used by many developing economies to attract FDI (e.g. China 
and Vietnam) studies show that it is of far less consequence to FDI attraction than host market size 
and distance. Total costs of production taken together are however largely influential in the 
direction of FDI flows. High labour costs may be mitigated by the infrastructural spend on health 
and education which would result in a healthy, skilled and more efficient workforce which in turn 
acts to  lower costs (Bellak, Leibrecht and Riedl, 2008).  
In understanding M&A attraction it is important to first mention the literature on FDI attraction, 
that is why firms go to foreign locations. According to Fontagne and Mayer (2005), firms will go 
to foreign locations if there exists sufficient demand in the country or region, total production costs 
incurred at the location are low, intense competition is not a threat, public policies are 
advantageous and institutions create productive and efficient economies in which to operate. 
Foreign locations may also be desirable in order to leverage economies of scale, take advantage of 





advantages to gain market and to escape from increasing home market competition (Rugman & Li, 
2007 and Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). Therefore we may expect that economies offering 
locational factors conducive specifically to M&A’s will display greater attractiveness values. 
In light of the statements above, host country demand amongst other factors is responsible for the 
decisions of firms to choose foreign locations it leads us to believe that market size or the GDP of 
a country has an important role to play in M&A attrction. Therefore it may be expected that the 
larger a countries GDP the greater the M&A activity it will attract. 
First documented by Knickerbocker (1973) is an idiosyncrasy in the movement of firms. Firms 
follow into locations where other firms from their industry have already entered despite the 
increase in competitive intensity this generates. Therefore M&A attractiveness may also be related 
to the number of firms already functioning within the host market. 
This agglomeration tendency may be linked to supply chain and input-output linkages. Further by 
locating affiliates close to other multinational affiliates they may be able to benefit from absorbing 
technological spillovers. The effect of this would be the lowering of R&D costs and raising the 
firm’s competitiveness by enabling it to stay abreast of competitor strategy (Fontagne and Mayer, 
2005). 
REGIONAL COUNTRY LEADER EFFECT 
 
Part of the focus of this paper is to explore a regional dimension of FDI and M&A’s. Much of the 
literature on regional leadership effects concerns Japanese FDI into the Asia-Pacific region. The 
‘flying geese’ model by Ozawa describes the trend where mature products and industries are 





(Ozawa, 2003 and Kojima, 2000). As the host country costs rise so it too moves toward higher 
value add products and the production of the good moves to the next low cost destination 
(Edgington and Hayter, 2000; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 1998). In this way advantages such as 
technology, employment, real incomes and innovation may cascade through a region (Clark, 
1993).  
Several studies have shown that when MNC’s first plan to internationalise they choose 
geographically and culturally proximate regions, this is known as the ‘market familiarity 
principle’. In this way home based skills, advantages, management and resources may be 
leveraged to minimize transaction costs (Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999).   
In ‘Regionalism and the Regionalisation of International Trade’, Gaulier, Sébastien and Ünal-
Kesenci (2004) explain the idea that regionalisation is a natural pattern and that the volume of 
inter-neighbour trade between countries is high due to the economic sense of trading over shorter 
distances. Various studies find that countries have the bulk of their foreign trade concentrated 
within a particular triad region (Gaulier, Sébastien and Ünal-Kesenci, 2004;   Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2004). In their study on 64 Japanese multinationals Collinson and Rugman (2008) found 
that only three operated globally with the remainder concentrating 80 % of their operations (sales 
& assets) intra-regionally. 
More importantly, with implications for this study and the attraction of M&A’s, was the finding 
that region-specific regionalisation trends are linked to changes in infrastructure, information or 
cultural ties. Large regional trade agreements, especially when a custom union exists, were also 
shown to have positive effects on trade volume and created lucrative opportunities for foreign 
producers. The trade agreements allowed access to a large market from a single country, even if it 





reinforces the importance of institutions in developing regional trade and mentions specifically 
that a positive “gravity” factor of regionalisation could be the swift acceleration of GDP growth of 
other countries within a region.   
Policy makers should take note that contractual relationships present significant risks to foreign 
MNE’s in host countries which have linguistic, legal and economic institutions systems vastly 
different from the home country (Clark, 1993). Promoting and facilitating corporate governance 
would have a positive impact on inter-company linkages with the resultant promotion of regional 
development. The ability to access risk finance andinstruments make it critical for a firm to 
operate in an advantageous national location within a region (Clark, 1993).   
Pajunen (2008) reinforces the above idea of a MNE firm searching for the most advantageous 
location within a region. In order to access the rapidly expanding emerging economy market a firm 
may make a strategic decision to enter South America or South–East Asia and will then search for 
the most attractive location within that region to trade from (Pajunen, 2008). As we have seen in 
an earlier paragraph, the growing number of regional trade agreements allows the MNE to transact 
with minimal trade costs within a region. The regional leader attracts the most FDI in a region. 
This research asks the question who attracts the most M&A’s and why? This question may be 
answered by the findings of Qian, Li, Li and Qian (2008). 
Qian, Li, Li and Qian (2008) confirm that firms are gionally focused and also offer an 
explanation for the regional internationalisation of firms rather than a fully global expansion. They 
find that firms’ costs are lower intra-regionally and hence performance is enhanced.  They add 
however that a threshold to performance is reached intra-regionally and that a developed country 
MNE may maximise performance by entering into a moderate number of developed country 





different. They advocate the careful selection and llocation of resources in developing regions as 
over-diversification here will result in costs outweighing benefits (Qian et al, 2008). This 
reinforces the idea of a regional FDI leader in the developing country context that is a ‘safer’ 
haven for MNE resource allocation. 
Taking into account this evidence, it is possible to assume that as regional cooperation is enhanced 
so inter-regional trade is  encouraged which results  in greater amounts of FDI  and M&A’s which 
will flow into a regional leader country with the safest reputation.  
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
An imperative of a foreign investment entry strategy is to minimise the cost of entry in order to 
render the venture more profitable. Cultural barriers and socio-political differences between the 
entrant and host raise the cost of transacting and thus the entry mode chosen will attempt to reduce 
this.   
 M&A’ S AND CAPABILITY SEEKING MULTINATIONALS 
 
 Firms have capabilities in their own markets which are not necessarily internationally mobile, 
may not be useful in a foreign market or the firm may require a set of additional competencies to 
operate successfully in the foreign market (Anand a Delios, 2002).  
Anand and Delios (2002) offer a description of upstream capabilities which are described as 
fungible and portable; an example of this may be intangible technological know-how.  By 
engaging in a cross-border M&A the firm is able to access the local knowledge and downstream 
capabilities of a local firm and use this to supplement its portable advantages in serving the new 
host market (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007). Examples of capabilities or advantages which the local 





distribution channels, a capability to manoeuvre through local ‘institutional voids’ and challenges 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2005), emission rights for enviro mental pollution, landing slots at airports, 
scarce land or  oil/mineral extraction rights amongst others (Horn and Persson, 2001).  
Fungible upstream capabilities are a stronger driver for acquisitions than downstream capabilities 
which are less fungible (Anand and Delios, 2002).  Developing countries are less likely to have 
superior technological capabilities than the potential developed country acquiring firm. The lower 
sophistication of the developing market would therefor  limit the number of acquisition targets 
available for a developed country MNE. Acquisition targets for downstream capabilities 
(marketing, brand etc.) would hold greater appeal in countries with large target markets. The 
number of M&A deals can therefore be expected to relate to market size (GDP) and market 
sophistication (represented by aspects like the levl of human development and infrastructure). 
The number of M&A deals will also be related to thenumber of local acquisition targets available 
which in turn is dependent on the level of development of the country.  
ACQUISITION DRIVERS 
The initial choice to engage in FDI over export is dependent on how profitable the firm expects the 
greenfield or M&A to be. The second strategic choice of greenfield over M&A is related to the 
firm's ownership of productive assets and varies both across and within industries (Raff, Ryan and 
Stähler, 2005). 
A cross border-merger provides access to a foreign market whilst a national merger relieves 
domestic competitive pressure. When trade costs are low however national mergers do not reduce 
competitive pressure and firms will seek access to foreign markets through a cross-border merger. 
Economic integration results in lowered trade costs and therefore increased competition which is 





which is dependent on host country regulations willtherefore increase the level of cross-border 
M&A activity.  
The literature describes one of the main advantages of cross-border M&A’s to be the access which 
it provides to a foreign market (Horn  and Persson, 2001) whilst within border mergers are 
generally attributed to relieving domestic competitive pressure (Bjorvatn, 2004).   
Raff et al (2008) explains that firms entering a foreign market will approach local firms with a 
merger and acquisition or joint venture proposal in order to enjoy the synergies of such a 
relationship. Raff et al (2008) maintain that a merger & acquisition offer will be accepted by the 
local firm if the profitability and success of a greenfield investment by the multinational is likely 
and credible. Further, the greater the anticipated profitability of the greenfield investment the 
lower the merger & acquisition price offered to thelocal firm. Hence M& A would be preferred 
over greenfield as the entry costs would be lowered. The choice of greenfield over M&A will 
depend on the number of competitors in the market and the market potential as this affects the 
anticipated profitability of the greenfield venture or the cost of the M&A (Raff et al, 2007).  
This leads us to hypothesize that countries with greater market potential (GDP, GDP per capita 
and HDI) and fewer local competitors will result in a lowering of the cost of an M&A which in 
turn results in increased volumes of M&A. 
CULTURAL CHALLENGES AND THE ‘L IABILITY OF FOREIGNNESS’ 
Mergers and acquisitions and partially owned ventures offer the opportunity for a foreign MNE to 
access local assets such as brand, distribution networks and a client-base which is difficult to 
mobilise from home by working with local established companies (Petrou 2007). In instances 





(2000) advocate the use of acquisitions in order to confer legitimacy and acceptance on the foreign 
MNE.   
However, M&A’s involve greater costs when the cultural distance is high and therefore Chang and 
Rosenzweig, (2001) assert that firms would be more likely to choose greenfield entry to avoid the 
costs of integrating diverse company cultures.  Greenfi ld investments offer total affiliate control 
and avoid post merger cultural difficulties but take a far longer time period to establish market 
presence and require substantial experience and know-how of local conditions (Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001).  
Most recently Slangen and Hennart (2008) have found that MNE’s will prefer acquisitions in 
culturally distant locations if they have little international experience or if they plan to grant the 
subsidiary autonomy in marketing. If they are interationally experienced or have no market 
related concerns then a greenfield is preferred in culturally distant locations.  
The entry choice is also industry-specific depending o  the resource requirements of the firm.  
Manufacturing operations tend to favour greenfield deals whereas in advertising where brand and 
product are tailored to local tastes acquisitions are preferred as FDI entry strategies (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988). The above information alludes to the idea that M&A’s will tend to occur in the 
services industry as it confers on the MNE an understanding of, acceptance within and access to a 
foreign market. 
The information examined above dealt with the cultura  challenges of M&A’s. The next section 
will broach the subject of institutional challenges in M&A deals especially in developing 
economies.   





Approximately 70%-80% of all mergers fail (Bretherton, 2003) and KPMG reports only 17 % of 
cross border M&A’ s create value while 53% destroy value (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, Pisano, 
2004).  These statistics may be part of the explanatio  for the lower volumes of M&A deals in 
developing economies where investor firms may be wary of entering into deals already known to 
have high failure rates and then compounding this in an environment fraught with challenges i.e. 
developing regions. Therefore many organisations choose to enter into strategic alliances and joint 
ventures which allow them the benefits of searching for new market opportunities, sharing in 
innovation and technology, overcoming host regulatory requirements and developing new 
capabilities. Importantly however these alliances are easier and less costly for companies to enter 
and exit should the need arise. 
IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL AND FINANCIAL FRAMEWORKS TO SUPORT MNE’S 
Market inefficiencies related to the resource profile and institutional profile of a host economy 
may be overcome by the entry strategy of the MNE. Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) assert that an 
acquisition is the quickest way for a firm to build a sizable presence in a foreign market. The 
challenges of this mode however involve the post acquisition cultural merge, the risk of 
overpaying and an inability to fully assess the value of the acquired assets (Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001).  
In a developing market context additional challenges to M&A’s include the scarcity or absence of 
legal, financial and institutional organisations and structures through which the deal could be 
investigated, formalised and protected and is further complicated by the existence of burdensome 






It is expected that M&A attractive economies in thedeveloping world may be identified as a group 
distinct from FDI attractive economies depending on the context of the location factors of the host 
economies. It can therefore be hypothesised that M&A attractiveness does not equal FDI 
attractiveness and that varying levels of M&A attrac iveness occur. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
SAMPLE AND DATA SOURCES 
The World Bank and UNCTAD, through the annual World Investment Report and World 
Investment directory, publish data on over 210 economies which are divided into developed and 
developing economies. In this study data were assembled for 117 developing and transition 
economies. Blonigen and Wang (2004) in their examintio  of the FDI experiences of developed 
and developing economies conclude that the variation of data across these groups makes it 
inappropriate to pool data on them in empirical analyses. A further rationalisation for the isolation 
of developing economies from developed economies in this paper can be found in North (1994), 
he writes that the experiences of actors in highly developed modern economies may not be 
compared to that of individuals operating under conditions of uncertainty, political or economic. 
In order to identify regional FDI leaders, for the purpose of this study, the country data was 
divided into regional groupings (see table below) according to the United Nations Statistical 
Office as published in the UNCTAD World Investment Report classification for 2007.  
[Table 1 about here] 
VARIABLES AND MEASURES 
The analysis aims to separate FDI attractiveness from M&A attractiveness and to rank the 





of M&A’s in the sample of developing economies was t ken from the latest available M&A and 
greenfield data published by UNCTAD (based on data from Thomson Financial) over the period 
2004 to 2006.  
Six variables were created. The table below describes, explains and shows the grouping of the 
variables. Group A in table 2 below represents country M&A attractiveness. Two measures 
numbers 1 and 2 were used to measure attractiveness at the country level. One is volume based; 
that is the number of deals in one country as a percentage of the country’s total deals, whilst two is 
value based that is the dollar value of deals which flowed into the respective country as a 
percentage of GDP. Thus the measure for country level M&A activity has two dimensions in this 
way the variable carries richer information and is less likely to be skewed by a single, large dollar 
value deal. As this measure is computed using per country total deals and per country GDP as the 
denominator, it is an intra-country measure.  
Group B in table 2 represents regional M&A attractiveness and contains 3 measures. Again both a 
volume and a dollar value were used to measure regional M&A activity for the same reasons listed 
above for country attractiveness. If for example a country attracted one very large dollar value 
deal, but no other deals, it may be read as an M&A attractive economy when in fact it only 
attracted a single deal. This regional group of variables is computed using the number of total 
regional M&A deals, the number of total regional FDI deals and the dollar value of the total 
regional FDI inflow as the denominators. Thus it measures the country’s M&A volume and value 
respective to the regional total. It is an intra- regional value.  
Group C in table 4 contains one measure for the FDI attractiveness of a country in a region. This 
measure includes all deals (greenfield and M&A) which a country attracts with respect to the total 





                                                 [Table 2 about here] 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The statistical challenge in this study was to find a method which would allow for the separation 
of FDI attractive economies from M&A attractive economies and of M&A attractive from M&A 
unattractive economies. Two statistical methods were utilised to test the variables. A cluster 
analysis allowed for countries with similarities based on the variables to be clustered together. A 
principal component analysis was performed in order to create an M&A attractiveness ranking of 
the sample countries.  
CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION TO CLUSTER THEORY 
 
A cluster analysis is a statistical tool which allows for the discovery of meaningful structures 
within data without explaining why they exist. This allows data to be sorted into groups or 
categories where the members of each group have a high degree of association with each other and 
a minimal association if they belong to another group. Thus this technique places the economies 
under study into clusters based on well defined similarity rules and finds the most significant 
groups of objects. (http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stcluan.html) Clustering is the term used to 
describe the presence of separate and distinct groups in the data however if clustering is not 
recognized by failing to visually inspect the data (scatterplots or another graphing technique), the 
correlation coefficient may suggest that no relationship exists even though within each cluster a 
clear relationship may indeed exist (Siegel, 2000).  
As an initial exploratory step and in order to determine which of the variables listed in Table1 





The data for some variables such as GDP had a very different scale to the some of the smaller 
scale values e.g. Polcon 3 index. The data was thus standardized to allow each variable an equal 
opportunity to display significance in the cluster analysis and prevent any one variable dominating 
(Boudier-Bensebaa, 2008).  
A cluster analysis was run on the variables listed in table 2 above. A four cluster solution was 
accepted as all the clustering variables proved to be significant.  
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS 
 
A principal components analysis allows for the identification of underlying factors in the  variables 
which account for the largest variance amongst the data set of 117 countries. Table 3 below shows 
the  variables used in the principal component analysis grouped at the country and regional level. 
This analysis is undertaken in order to create an attractiveness value per country which allows the 
developing countries to be ranked based on their M&A attractiveness score. Understanding 
Principal Component Analysis 
 
The principal component analysis (PCA) is a data reduction technique that distils the essence of 
several variables into a smaller number of components which explain the variance in the data. The 
regional and country variables listed above showed correlations but rather than discard them they 
are rolled into a two factor composite M&A attractiveness value one factor for regional 
attractiveness and one factor for country attractiveness. The principle of parsimony (simplicity and 
reduction) is followed by creating an attractiveness value out of the variables, in this way more 
meaningful and richer measure is created and the dimensions of the data set become more 





The Eigen analysis is the name of the mathematical te hnique used in PCA. Eigen values show the 
percentage of variance explained by each component, the largest Eigen value is the first principal 
component, the second largest Eigen value is the second principal component, and so on. 
(http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat/manual/Principal_component_analysis.html). The Eigen values 
for our study were determined; these values were then plotted on a scree plot to illustrate the 
importance of each of the components.     
A factor analysis was performed on the all the variables in table 3 above. The PC analysis will 
create factors by reducing the data into its underlying dimensions. These factors allow for an 
attractiveness score to be generated for each country.  
 
THE VARIABLE DENOMINATORS 
 
                                                  [Table 3 about here] 
The country level variables were expressed as percentag s of per country GDP, per country FDI 
inward stock and total number of per country FDI deals. Therefore outcome values expressed are 
all calculated with respect to intra-country measure . 
The regional level variable denominators included the total FDI flows into a geographic region, 
the total number of M&A deals in a region and the total number of FDI deals in a region (e.g. 
Central America, North Africa etc) and are expressed as percentages. Therefore all values are 
calculated with respect to regional totals.  
By separating the variables a richer result is obtained, the analysis is able to pick out regional 
leaders and interesting countries which may not be FDI attractive but nevertheless are M&A 





and regional level the interesting case of Libya where M&A deals predominate would have been 
lost as its total FDI is so small. 
RESULTS: THE FOUR CLUSTER SOLUTION, DESCRIPTIONS AND MEMBER COUNTRIES 
 
The results of the four cluster solution is summarised as a profile plot with the means percentages 
included in table 4 below. The premise that a country level and regional level group exist in the 
data was confirmed with the cluster analysis.  
All the countries in cluster 1 showed a high value for the intra-country number (or volume) of 
M&A deals respective to the other clusters. Cluster 1 countries are intra-country performers. They 
do not perform well at a regional level. Cluster 4 countries are country level performers like 
cluster 1 but perform better on M&A dollar sales value than on M&A volume. For the purpose of 
this study clusters 1 and 4 are both considered as country level performers, their distinction lies in 
a difference of measure that is volume of M&A deals versus value of M&A deals respectively. 
Cluster 2 displays a strong performance on the regional level M&A variables. Cluster 2 also 
displays the strongest regional FDI attraction. Cluster 2 countries are regional performers.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Cluster 3 countries do not perform on any of the variables; they may be labelled poor M&A 
performers. Table 5 above lists the member countries of each cluster. 
In light of the descriptions defined above, each of the four clusters has displayed distinctive mean 





attraction. In order to illustrate each clusters leve  of attractiveness graphically, the clusters have 
been plotted onto the axes above (Figure 1), the y axis representing country attractiveness and the 
x axis representing regional attractiveness.  
PC ANALYSIS AND EIGEN VALUES: 
 
The PC analysis in table 6 below shows the reduction of the five variables into a two factor 
solution which explains 80, 3% of the variance of the underlying variables. The Eigen value is the 
variance explained by each factor of the underlying variables.  
[Table 6 about here] 
The PC analysis confirmed the premise held of there b ing both a regional and a country effect in 
the data by loading all the regional variables on factor 1 and the country  variables on factor 2. 
Factor 1 is a regional M&A attractiveness factor and factor 2 is an intra- country M&A 
attractiveness factor. The 117 countries on the data table are run against these attractiveness values 
in order to obtain a regional and a country level attractiveness value for each. This is accomplished 
by multiplying each country’s variable score by thefactors in the table. The regional PC factor 
value allows for the generation of a regional attrac iveness value for each country whilst the intra-
country PC value allows for the generation of an intra-country attractiveness value for each 
country. Two lists are thus created, a list of the 117 developing countries with regional 
attractiveness values and another containing the sam  117 developing countries with intra-country 
attractiveness values.  






In order to make sense of the country and regional attractiveness values each list was ranked and 
ordered so that the countries appear in order of attractiveness. The top quartile or quartile 1 (Q1) is 
the least attractive to M&A activity, the bottom quartile or quartile 4 (Q4) is the most attractive. 
Therefore the higher the ranking the more M&A attractive the country is. The following countries 
were not ranked as they had no M&A activity: Azerbaijan, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guyana, Honduras, Myanmar, Nepal, Paraguay, Qatar, 
Senegal and Suriname.    
At the regional level the most M&A attractive economies were India, RSA and Brazil, Russia, 
Turkey and Mexico, Table 7 below lists and ranks the most regionally M&A attractive economies. 
Table 8 ranks the least attractive regional economies with Burkina Faso, Yemen and Albania being 
the most unattractive M&A economies regionally. 
The countries most attractive to M&A at the country level that is those countries attracting a 
greater number of intra-country M&A than greenfield deals are listed in Table 9, the top ranked 
countries are Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Bulgaria, Panama, and Ghana. The most unattractive 
country level economies for M&A activity are listed in Table 10, with the UAE as the most 
unattractive followed by Tanzania and Saudi Arabia. 
[Table 7 about here] 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 











Figure 2 above is a scatter plot of the country level economies list on the ‘y’ axis and the regional 
level economies list on the ‘x’ axis. The most attrac ive country level economies (attract more 
M&A’s than greenfield internally) can be seen on the upper left section. The most attractive M&A 
economies on the regional list can be seen on the low r right section of the plotted area. These 
economies attract the most M&A deals in their geographic regions. The line drawn through the 
origin recreates the M&A attractiveness axes shown in Figure 1 which can be superimposed over 
this plot.  
DISCUSSION 
For both sets of analyses the regional FDI leaders co related. This list included the Cluster 2 
countries and top ranked regional M&A attractive countries (India, RSA and Brazil, Russia, 
Turkey and Mexico). The large market sizes of these regional leader countries have several 
implications in terms of M&A attraction. First, large markets attract market seeking MNE’s, the 
literature shows that these firms are likely to utilise M&A’s as a mode of entry (Buch and De 
Long, 2001). The fact that they are economic hubs and attract greater volumes of FDI than other 
developing countries also results in an increased pr sence of foreign affiliates operating in their 
markets (Qian and Delios 2008; and Kolstad and Villanger, 2008). These affiliates are likely to be 
followed by service industry firms (following their domestic clients) into these foreign markets 
(Qian and Delios 2008) thereby creating a virtuous circle for increased FDI and M&A activity. 
These countries are FDI poster boys in their respective regions and are M&A attractive by virtue 
of being FDI attractive. 
A distinct group of countries emerged as country level M&A leaders in the PC analysis and as the 
members of clusters 1 and 4. These comprise an interesting and eclectic mix of countries which 
include amongst others Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Bulgaria, Panama, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, 





attracted a greater amount of M&A activity than greenfield activity. In these countries, M&A 
attractiveness is not distorted by the regional leader effect and associated FDI attractiveness; hence 
M&A host location attractiveness can be studied in a purer form.  
Differences exist between the regional leader group and the country level leader groups which 
make these groups unique. The Cluster 4 and top ranked country level M&A attractive economies 
must possess some interesting locational features con idering that these are smaller economies 
which do not comprise the largest markets in the sample. Given that M&A’s are more frequently 
used as a mode of entry in developed countries, location features may exist in the country level 
attractive group which mimic certain developed market conditions. M&A attractiveness at the 
country level may be a marker for development.  
The cluster 2 and regional leader groups whilst attracting large volumes of M&A activity within a 
region were not attracting a greater number of M&A deals internally. Greenfield deals continue to 
dominate these markets. In other words, it is partly t ue that these countries were M&A attractive 
by virtue of being FDI attractive. Examining however the PC analysis at the country level of M&A 
attraction and the cluster 4 countries in the cluster analysis, we are able to identify true M&A 
attractive economies i.e. economies attracting a greate  ratio of M&A activity to greenfield 
investments.  
It can now be stated that FDI attractiveness does nt automatically mean M&A attractiveness as 
the analysis has isolated clear groups of countries which are FDI attractive and which attract more 
greenfield activity and those which are M&A attractive.  
Lipsey comments on the absence in the literature of the effects which FDI may have on a 
country’s consumers. Mergers and acquisitions may result in the consolidation of industries 





Yeaple, 2007). Greenfield operations would have the opposite effect by reducing the power of 
local producer monopoly positions and increasing local competition. At the same time superior 
technology and innovation brought in by the acquiring firms may improve local production 
efficiencies thereby lowering the local cost of goods (Lipsey, 2002). The dissimilar spillover 
effects of greenfield versus M&A is a clear motivaton for the two modes of entry to be analysed 
and understood as distinct entities, even though much of the literature on the developmental role of 
FDI treats FDI as a single entity (Dunning & Narula, 1996; Dunning 2001; Rugman & Li, 2007). 
The effects of M&A investment into developing regions, local linkages and their impact on growth 
and development in the host may also be areas of great interest especially to policy makers. 
Future research directions would be to identify exactly what the macro-economic markers of 
development are which attract M&A’s to certain developing economies. An understanding of 
location factors and macro-economic markers of development in developing countries may also be 
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No. Regional Divisions No. Regional Divisions 
1.  North Africa 7. 
Central America 
2.  West Africa 8. 
Middle East (West Asia) 
3.  Central Africa 9. 
South Asia 
4.  East Africa 10. 
South-East Asia 
5.  Southern Africa 11. 
Southeast Europe 
6. South America 12. 





TABLE 2: EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES 
Variables for the Cluster 
Analysis 
Value or Volume 
Based 
Explanation of Variable Distinction 
A - Country level attractiveness variables 
  
1 - M&A deals per country as 
a % of total number of country 
deals 
volume based 
Examines the volume of per country M&A deals relative 
to the total number of FDI deals entering that country. 
The intra- country proportion of M&A to FDI in terms of 
volume. 
2 - MA sales as % of GDP avg 
2004-2006 
value based in  US $'s 
Examines the value of per country M&A deals relative to 
the GDP of the same country. An intra-country measure 
of the proportion of M&A to GDP in terms of value. 
B - Regional level attractiveness variables 
  1 - M&A  deals per country as 
a % of total  regional M&A's 
2004-2006 
volume 
Examines the volume of per country M&A deals relative 
to the M&A deal volume of countries in the region. An
inter-country but intra-regional measure. 
2 - no of per country MA 
deals as a % of all regional 
deals  2004-2006 
volume 
Examines the volume of per country M&A deals relative 
to the volume of total FDI deals (greenfield & M&A) of 
countries in the region. An inter-country but intra-
regional measure. 
3 - M&A sales per country as 
a % of  total regional FDI 
inflow ( US$  millions) 2004-
2006 
value in US $'s 
Examines the value in $'s of per country M&A sales 
relative to the value of all FDI inflows  into the r gion 
showing the country's share or proportion of M&A sale   
value in the region. 
C - Overall FDI attractiveness  variable 
  no of deals per country as % 
of total regional deals 2004-
2006 
volume 
Examines which country in a region attracts the most FDI 













TABLE 3:  PRINCIPAL COMPONENT VARIABLES  
Level of 
attraction 
Combined Country Level And Regional Level Variables In Order To Create 
Component Attractiveness Values At The Country Level And At The Regional Level 
Country level 
  
M&A sales per country as a % of FDI inward stock per country (US $millions) 2004 
-2006 




M&A  deals per country as a % of total  regional M&A's 2004-2006 
no of per country MA deals as a % of all regional deals  2004-2006 



















Table 1: profiles of cluster means for a 4 cluster solution 
 










Table 5: CLUSTER COUNTRY MEMBERS 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 4 
Belize Brazil Armenia 
Brunei Daruss India Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso Indonesia Colombia 
Congo Malaysia Croatia 
Guatemala Mexico Ghana 
Kyrgyzstan Romania Mauritius 
Libya Russian Fed Panama 
Macedonia, South Africa Ukraine 
Mozambique Thailand  
Nicaragua Turkey  
Paraguay U A E  
Qatar   
Rwanda   
Swaziland   
Zimbabwe   
Cluster  3 Cluster 3 Cluster 3 
Albania Ethiopia Nigeria 
Algeria Gabon Oman 
Angola Georgia Pakistan 
Argentina Guinea Peru 
Azerbaijan Guyana Philippines 
Bahrain Honduras Saudi Arabia 
Bangladesh Iran Senegal 
Belarus Iraq Sierra Leone 
Bolivia Jordan Sri Lanka 
Bosnia & Herz Kazakhstan Sudan 
Botswana Kenya Suriname 
Cambodia Kuwait Syria 
Cameroon Lao PDR Tajikistan 
Chile Lebanon Tunisia 
Congo, DRC Madagascar Turkmenistan 
Costa Rica Mali Uganda 
Côte d' Ivoire Mauritania Tanzania 
Ecuador Moldova Uruguay 
Egypt Morocco Uzbekistan 
El Salvador Myanmar Venezuela 
Equatorial Guinea Namibia Viet Nam 










Level And Regional 
Level Variables In 
Order To Create 
Component 
Attractiveness Values 
At The Country Level 










Explained by  
Components 
Country level  
M&A sales per country 
as a % of FDI inward 
stock per country (US 
$millions) 2004 -2006 
-0.015066 0.857492 
  





M&A  deals per 





no of per country MA 
deals as a % of all 




M&A sales per country 
as a % of  total regional 











Table7: REGIONAL LEVEL ATTRACTIVENESS- most attract ive ranking 
Regional  Level M&A Attractiveness 
Quartile 4 -Most Attractive 
Rank Regional M&A 
Attractiveness 
Attractiveness Value Above Average 
India                            87 4.47456 
South Africa                     86 3.59947 
Brazil                           85 3.11423 
Russian Federation               84 2.70295 
Turkey                           83 2.18032 
Mexico                           82 2.10503 
Indonesia                        81 1.96844 
Malaysia                         80 1.83932 
Thailand                         79 1.50218 
Romania                          78 1.00295 
Argentina                        77 0.95504 
U A E             76 0.71507 
Egypt                            75 0.58127 
Bulgaria                         74 0.49219 
Ukraine                          73 0.48130 
Chile                            72 0.41931 
Colombia                         71 0.40345 
Peru                             70 0.13893 
Pakistan                         69 0.12567 







Table 8: Regional level attractiveness- least attractive 
 
least attractive Regional Level 







Regional Level M&A 








Burkina Faso                     1 -0.81391 Costa Rica                      35 -0.46264 
Yemen                            2 -0.62301 El Salvador                     36 -0.46137 
Albania                          3 -0.59695 Rwanda                          37 -0.46100 
Tajikistan                       4 -0.58134 Madagascar                      38 -0.45911 
Belize                           5 -0.56980 
Syrian Arab 
Republic             
39 -0.45391 
Turkmenistan                     6 -0.56586 Bangladesh                  40 -0.45035 
Lao PDR 7 -0.55855 Uzbekistan                      41 -0.44220 
Gabon                            8 -0.54206 Georgia                         42 -0.42553 
Sri Lanka                        9 -0.53908 Iraq                            43 -0.42284 
Botswana                         10 -0.53824 Viet Nam                        44 -0.41269 
Guinea                           11 -0.53655 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina           
45 -0.41006 
Kuwait                           12 -0.53403  Tanzania      46 -0.40278 
Côte d' Ivoire                   13 -0.53331 Kenya                           47 -0.37712 
Kyrgyzstan                       14 -0.52797 Mozambique                      48 -0.37626 
Iran      15 -0.52388 Namibia                         49 -0.36841 
Swaziland                        16 -0.51088 Oman                            50 -0.35828 
Sierra Leone                     17 -0.51028 Bahrain                         51 -0.35541 
Mali                             18 -0.50993 Saudi Arabia                 52 -0.35395 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya          19 -0.50966 Zimbabwe                        53 -0.35140 
Mauritania                       20 -0.50856 Zambia                          54 -0.34751 
Armenia                          21 -0.50707 Ecuador                       55 -0.31359 
Algeria                          22 -0.50669 Uganda                          56 -0.31281 
Bolivia                          23 -0.50637 Panama                          57 -0.31113 
Cambodia                         24 -0.50389 Sudan                           58 -0.30115 
Moldova, Republic of            25 -0.50075 Venezuela                       59 -0.25848 
Belarus                          26 -0.49762 Kazakhstan                      60 -0.22807 
Macedonia, TFYR              27 -0.49691 Mauritius                       61 -0.21374 
Lebanon                          28 -0.49085 Ghana                           62 -0.21133 
Nicaragua                        29 -0.48372 Tunisia                         63 -0.17359 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of    
30 -0.48345 Nigeria                         64 -0.13017 
Angola                           31 -0.48291 Jordan                          65 -0.12656 





Uruguay                          33 -0.46757 Morocco                         67 -0.07754 
Guatemala                        34 -0.46471    
 
Table 9: Country level M&A attractiveness- most attractive countries 
 
Country Level M&A Attractiveness Quartile 4 -
Most Attractive 
Rank Attractiveness Value Above Average 
Mauritius                        87 5.44211 
Burkina Faso                     86 4.67217 
Bulgaria                         85 2.45823 
Panama                           84 2.04796 
Ghana                            83 1.89195 
Kyrgyzstan                       82 1.06603 
Armenia                          81 0.90303 
Croatia                          80 0.87151 
Ukraine                          79 0.82457 
Colombia                         78 0.81623 
Yemen                            77 0.78430 
Romania                          76 0.77845 
Turkey                           75 0.71227 
Sudan                            74 0.65421 
Tunisia                          73 0.42570 
Uzbekistan                       72 0.36499 
Mauritania                       71 0.32190 
Peru                             70 0.26612 
Ecuador                          69 0.24742 
Indonesia                        68 0.23859 
Lao PDR 67 0.20139 
South Africa                     66 0.10116 
Macedonia          65 0.04362 
Pakistan                         64 0.04359 
Belize                           63 0.03089 






Table 10: Country level attractiveness- least attractive 
Country level M&A 






Country level M&A 






UA E        1 -0.69652 Rwanda                          31 -0.46953 
Tanzania      2 -0.68043 Russian Fed               32 -0.46579 
Saudi Arabia                    3 -0.68009 Guatemala                       33 -0.46387 
Angola                          4 -0.67564 Philippines                     34 -0.45862 
Libya    5 -0.67419 Gabon                           35 -0.43042 
Belarus                         6 -0.66567 Brazil                           36 -0.40607 
Sri Lanka                       7 -0.66410 Bangladesh                      37 -0.39852 
Algeria                         8 -0.66351 Uruguay                         38 -0.38454 
Guinea                          9 -0.66076 Costa Rica                      39 -0.38399 
Iraq                             10 -0.66060 Botswana                        40 -0.33595 
Iran  11 -0.64409 India                            41 -0.31087 
Sierra Leone                    12 -0.63906 Moldova      42 -0.30362 
Mali                             13 -0.62707 Bolivia                          43 -0.28460 
Zimbabwe                        14 -0.62270 Egypt                            44 -0.28442 
Côte d' Ivoire                  15 -0.62038 Nigeria                         45 -0.28428 
Viet Nam                        16 -0.61471 Argentina                       46 -0.25341 
Mozambique                      17 -0.61461 Thailand                        47 -0.23769 
Bahrain                         18 -0.59631 Namibia                         48 -0.22207 
Madagascar                      19 -0.58028 Albania                         49 -0.22091 
Oman                            20 -0.57740 Bosnia & Herzeg    50 -0.22082 
Tajikistan                      21 -0.57596 Malaysia                        51 -0.21129 
Cambodia                        22 -0.56811 Kazakhstan                      52 -0.18592 
Congo                        23 -0.56112 Kenya                            53 -0.18396 
Turkmenistan                    24 -0.55555 Georgia                         54 -0.16633 
Mexico                          25 -0.55058 Morocco                         55 -0.14784 
Zambia                         26 -0.54445 Chile                            56 -0.09800 
Lebanon                         27 -0.53035 Uganda                          57 -0.06308 
Venezuela                       28 -0.51967 Nicaragua                       58 -0.03914 
Congo 29 -0.50304 Jordan                          59 -0.03806 
Swaziland                       30 -0.48027 Syria 60 -0.01932 
























Figure 2: REGIONAL LEVEL ATTRACTIVENESS COUNTRIES P LOTTED ON 'Y' AXIS; COUNTRY LEVEL M&A 
















APPENDIX 1-EXCLUDED DATA 
In addition to the developed economy data, the following economies were also excluded from the 
study: Caribbean and Oceania economies (many of these island economies were very small, 
atypical and had missing data); China (over 48 % of the total number of deals for South and South- 
East Asian region were concluded in China in order to avoid skewing the findings for the rest of 
the region, Chinese data was excluded); Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea (these 
economies exhibit higher levels of development and sophistication than the rest of the sample and 
exhibit FDI levels higher than the typical developing countries of the sample group of this study); 
St Helena, Guinea Bissau, Mayotte, Reunion, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Palestinian 
Territory, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives and Timor Leste (these economies were all excluded as 
data for these economies was incomplete). 
 
  
